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Rich measures of micro-level violent con￿ ict intensity are key for successfully
providing insight into the legacy of civil war. Yet, the debate on how exactly
con￿ ict intensity should be measured has just started. This paper aims to fuel
this awakening debate. It is demonstrated how existing and widely available data
- population census data - can provide the basis for a useful measure of micro-
level con￿ ict intensity, i.e. a ￿ne Wartime Excess Mortality Index (WEMI). In
contrast to measures that are based on news reports or data from transitional
justice records, WEMI is relatively neutral to the cause of excess mortality, giving
equal weight to victims belonging to the conquering and defeated party, to vic-
tims of large-scale massacres and dispersed killings, to victims in easily accessible
locations and remote areas, and to direct and indirect victims of violence. The
measure is illustrated for the case of Rwanda and it is shown that in a straightfor-
ward empirical application of the impact of armed con￿ ict on schooling di⁄erent
measures for micro-level con￿ ict intensity yield strikingly di⁄erent results.
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11 Introduction
The challenge ahead for the micro-empirical literature on the legacy of civil war lies in
providing in depth insight into the various underlying mechanisms of the alleged con￿ ict trap.
As argued in a recent overview by Blattman and Miguel (2010): "The leading question is not
whether wars harm human capital stocks, but rather in what ways, how much, for whom,
and how persistently", or "The evidence is weakest where it is arguably most important:
in understanding civil wars￿e⁄ects on institutions, technology and social norms." Blattman
and Miguel (2010) further argue that new data is key to successfully embarking on these
challenges: ￿A major goal of civil war researchers should be the collection of new data￿ . Or
more speci￿cally, in the words of Restrepo, Spagat, and Vargas (2006): "Con￿ ict researchers
should prioritize the construction of more micro datasets that will facilitate detailed studies
of con￿ ict intensity and its dynamics".
Taking this advice to heart, this paper demonstrates how existing and widely available
data - population census data - can form the basis of a useful measure of micro-level con￿ ict
intensity.
Rwanda is taken as an illustration. This country in Africa￿ s turbulent Great Lakes region
experienced several forms of violence in the nineties, including genocide, civil war, reprisal
killings and (counter)insurgency (i.e. rural guerilla warfare). In order to measure Rwanda￿ s
complex and multidimensional con￿ ict cycle, I develop a spatial index of wartime excess
mortality relying on the 1991 and 2002 Rwandan population census. In particular, I subject
a number of community level wartime excess mortality proxies (1991-2002 di⁄erences in
mortality of sons and daughters, widowhood and orphanhood, and 2002 disability due to
armed con￿ ict) to principal component analysis (PCA). The ￿rst principal component (PC)
provides us with a Wartime Excess Mortality Index (WEMI) on a less to more scale for 145
administrative units ("communes")1.
The usefulness of the WEMI as a con￿ ict intensity measure in micro-empirical applica-
tions is threefold. First, given the complete coverage of the population in the census, the
WEMI yields a very ￿ne measure, i.e. at the level of small administrative units, which allows
to capture within province variation in the intensity of armed con￿ ict. Second, given the
wide availability and uniformity of population census data across even the least developed
1In the administrative subdivision of Rwanda Anno 1994, "prefectures" are followed by "communes",
"sectors" and "cells". In a series of subsequent reforms in 1996 and 2002, prefectures and communes were
replaced by respectively provinces and districts. Sectors are, after the cell, the lowest administrative units in
Rwanda with an average population size of about 5000 inhabitants. A commune has an average size of 134
squared km and counts on average 5.8 sectors.
2countries, the proposed measure can be generalized to other countries that have experienced
armed con￿ ict. A uniform con￿ ict intensity measure is valuable in the sense that it enhances
the comparability of di⁄erent country case studies and therefore the general lessons that can
be drawn from these studies. A third useful characteristic of the WEMI is its neutrality, i.e.
it is relatively neutral towards the cause of excess mortality. In contrast to con￿ ict intensity
measures derived from transitional justice records or news reports, the WEMI gives equal
weight to victims belonging to the conquering and defeated party, to victims of large-scale
massacres and dispersed killings, to victims in easily accessible locations and remote areas,
and to direct and indirect victims of violence2.
While this neutrality is useful in itself, e.g. to reduce omitted variable bias when estimat-
ing the impact of con￿ ict, it can also be the basis for the construction of a multi-dimensional
con￿ ict intensity measure. For the case of Rwanda, I develop a two-dimensional index by
augmenting the "neutral" set of excess mortality proxies from the population census data
with genocide proxies derived from the records of the gacaca (the Rwandan transitional jus-
tice system). Subjecting both sets of variables jointly to PCA results in a ￿rst and second
PC with a clear interpretation that allows to distinguish between, on the one hand, the
1994 genocide excess mortality (GEMI) and, on the other hand, other sources of wartime
excess mortality, including the 1991-1994 civil war, the 1994-1998 (counter)insurgency and
the 1994-1998 refugee crisis (CEMI).
There are always two sides to a coin and WEMI comes with at least two drawbacks.
First, WEMI may su⁄er from survival bias since it is based on information inferred from the
surviving population, more precisely from close relatives of those who died. Hence, WEMI
may be biased downward for communities were many families were entirely exterminated.
In the case of Rwanda survival bias is likely to be present and I will discuss how this bias
can be attenuated using information on the location of mass graves. A second drawback
is that other events unrelated to con￿ ict may explain wartime excess mortality (e.g. a
local harvest failure, a region-speci￿c mortality trend). A way to account for this is to
revert to Instrumental Variable Estimation (IVE) when using the measure in an econometric
application, an approach that has by now become standard in micro-empirical studies on the
legacy of violent con￿ ict.
The usefulness of the proposed one- and two-dimensional measures of con￿ ict intensity
2It is estimated that the number of indirect deaths of con￿ ict is six times larger than the number of
battle-related direct deaths. For a discussion of the causes and extent of the indirect deaths from war, see
the 2009/2010 Human Security Report (part II) (Human Security Report Project (2010)).
3is illustrated with an empirical application of the impact of armed con￿ ict on schooling
attainment in Rwanda. The identi￿cation of the impact relies on a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence-
in-di⁄erence estimation of years of education of a young (6-22) and an older (23-50) age
cohort in the 1991 and 2002 population census, with the treated group being the young
age cohort in the 2000 census residing in high con￿ ict intensity regions. To account for
the possible endogeneity of con￿ ict intensity, I use an instrumental variable approach. It is
shown that the results obtained with the newly proposed one- and two-dimensional measures
deviate strongly from the results obtained using a large number of alternative measures of
con￿ ict intensity in Rwanda that are either less ￿ne or less neutral or both.
This application is closely related to Akresh and de Walque (2008) who study years of
education of a young and an older age cohort in the 1992 and 2000 DHS survey. The authors
￿nd that children exposed to armed con￿ ict completed close to one-half year less education
which corresponds to a 18.3% drop relative to the average educational achievement. I don￿ t
contest this result. In fact, I ￿nd a qualitatively similar result using two rounds of population
census data. However, lacking detailed data on di⁄erent forms of violence in Rwanda, the
authors implicitly attribute the entire estimated schooling de￿cit to genocide. Using the
two-dimensional measure (GEMI, CEMI), I ￿nd that at least half of the estimated schooling
de￿cit can be attributed to other events in the Rwandan con￿ ict cycle.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the
con￿ ict intensity measures used in the micro-empirical literature on the legacy of violent
con￿ ict. Three types of measures are de￿ned. Each type is evaluated on its strengths and
weaknesses. Section 3 lays out the method for the newly proposed measure. Section 4
illustrates the method for the Rwandan con￿ ict cycle. Section 5 provides an application
studying the impact of violent con￿ ict on schooling in Rwanda. Section 6 compares the
results with previous measures. Section 7 concludes.
2 The micro-empirical literature on the legacy of violent con-
￿ ict: a typology according to the con￿ ict measure used
Below, I give an overview of micro level studies that analyze the impact of civil war on
socioeconomic outcomes3. For reasons of parsimony, studies that focus on two particular
groups of individuals, i.e. refugees and ex-combatants, are excluded from the overview.
3Civil war is de￿ned as a war between organized groups within a single nation state having more than
1,000 battle deaths in a single year (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, and Strand (2002)).
4Among the studies discussed, three main types are de￿ned according to the measurement
of con￿ ict exposure: con￿ ict exposure in time, con￿ ict exposure in space, and household
con￿ ict experience. Table 1 summarizes the studies by type.
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Insert Table 1 about here
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Type I: con￿ ict exposure in time The ￿rst type of study measures con￿ ict exposure by
combining information on the con￿ ict￿ s timing with birth dates of the surveyed population,
thus identifying the a⁄ected age cohort. This method is often feasible because in most
cases the con￿ ict￿ s start and end date are known by reasonable approximation. In addition,
commonly executed nationwide surveys include birth dates of the sampled population. The
most convincing results are obtained when scholars can use di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence estimates
relying on two nationwide surveys, one prior and one after the con￿ ict occurred, with the
treated group being the a⁄ected age cohort in the post-con￿ ict survey. However, even in
those cases, Type-I studies face two drawbacks. First, the outcomes studied are restricted to
age-related individual characteristics, e.g. schooling attainment, height-for-age z-scores and
fertility. Second, one cannot exclude that the results are driven by another event in the same
time span or by a time trend. To control for the latter, type-I studies often use a di⁄erence-
in-di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence estimation, relying on variation in con￿ ict intensity across time as
well as space.
Examples of type-I studies are Akresh and de Walque (2008), Akresh, Verwimp, and
Bundervoet (forthcoming), Alderman, Hoddinott, and Kinsey (2006), Bundervoet, Verwimp,
and Akresh (2009), Chamarbagwala and MorÆn (2008), de Walque (2004) and Leon (2010).
Among these seven studies, four focus on schooling outcomes, while three look at height-for-
age z-scores (see Table 1 for details). Leon (2010) uses the ￿nest measure of con￿ ict intensity.
He estimates the short and long term e⁄ects of the Peruvian civil strife on educational
achievement using both the con￿ ict￿ s variation in time and space. The spatial variation
is based on the number of human rights violations across 1833 districts provided by the
Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission. de Walque (2004) studies the impact of
the Cambodian Khmer Rouge terror regime on population structure, health status as well
as schooling levels. In contrast to the other studies, this one does not combine variation of
con￿ ict intensity in time with its variation in space. All other studies do so and therefore
overlap with studies of type II.
5Type II: con￿ ict exposure in space A ￿rst set of studies using spatial variation in
con￿ ict intensity relies on event data to construct a dummy variable taking one for provinces
heavily a⁄ected by violent con￿ ict and zero otherwise. The event data mostly stem from
journalists￿or human rights organizations￿reports. It is up to the researcher to interpret
the reports, which introduces a degree of arbitrariness. In addition, event data do not
systematically cover all areas of a country and are therefore inherently biased. For example,
areas that are relatively well accessible or areas in which large scale massacres took place may
receive more and better coverage compared to less accessible areas and areas where killings
were dispersed. Examples of studies that de￿ne a con￿ ict dummy based on event data are
two previously mentioned type-I studies (Akresh, Verwimp, and Bundervoet (forthcoming)
and Bundervoet, Verwimp, and Akresh (2009)) as well as Bundervoet (2007) and Justino
and Verwimp (2006).
A second set of type-II studies have constructed richer measures of geographic con￿ ict
intensity based on very diverse sources. This set includes three previously mentioned type-I
studies (Leon (2010), Chamarbagwala and MorÆn (2008) and Akresh and de Walque (2008)),
as well as an additional three studies: GonzÆlez and Lopez (2007), Miguel and Roland
(Forthcoming) and Li (2007). GonzÆlez and Lopez (2007) study the impact of violence in
Colombia on farm productivity. They make use of principal component analysis to construct
an index of political violence at the municipal level (Nr=55). The variables taken into account
are homicides, the number of guerrilla attacks, kidnapping, and displaced population. Miguel
and Roland (Forthcoming) use district level army intelligence data (Nr=584) for assessing
the long term socioeconomic impact of bombing in Vietnam. Li (2007) uses historic records
on damage to 17 railroad lines across China to study the impact of China￿ s warlord period
on investment and economic growth.
Despite the increased attention for developing ￿ner spatial measures of con￿ ict inten-
sity, there is still much room for improvement. In particular, there is a lack of uniformity
in the sense that the ￿ne micro-level con￿ ict intensity measures used so far are based on
rather particular country-speci￿c data. A noteworthy e⁄ort made for developing a uniform
micro-level measure of violent con￿ ict intensity is the Armed Con￿ ict Location and Event
Data (ACLED, Raleigh, Linke, Hegre, and Karisen (2010)), which provides geo-referenced
information on the location of battles and military activity. This information is derived
by screening news articles with language recognition software. However, press accounts are
often biased in the rapportation of events and computer news screening is sensitive to the
language in which events are reported. Another drawback, highlighted by Restrepo, Spagat,
6and Vargas (2006), is that battle events (e.g. between a rebel group and government troops)
may come short in re￿ ecting the con￿ ict￿ s impact on civilians. These drawbacks can partly
be overcome in time by using more sophisticated software programs and by coding di⁄erent
forms of violence.
A ￿nal set of type-II studies averages household level information at the community level
to obtain a spatial con￿ ict intensity measure (Bellows and Miguel (2009), Deininger (2003)
and Shemyakina (Forthcoming)). This set of studies overlaps with the third and ￿nal type.
Type III: Household con￿ ict experience questions Studies of type III rely on im-
plicit or explicit household con￿ ict experience questions for identifying the con￿ ict￿ s im-
pact. Examples of implicit questions are those inquiring about refugee experience, damage
to household dwellings and asset loss. A small number of such implicit household con￿ ict
experience questions are often part of commonly executed nationwide surveys (e.g. the
Integrated Household Living Conditions Survey (IHLCS). Studies using such information
include those that analyze socioeconomic outcomes across refugee and non refugee house-
holds (e.g. Kondylis (2008), Verwimp and Bavel (2004)), as well as one previously mentioned
type-I study, Shemyakina (Forthcoming), which uses information on damage to household
dwellings to study the impact of armed con￿ ict in Tajikistan on schooling outcomes.
Explicit household con￿ ict experience questions inquire about direct confrontations with
violence, e.g. as a perpetrator or as a victim. Surveys with explicit con￿ ict experience
questions are often the result of the researchers￿own e⁄ort and ￿eldwork, because such
questions are rarely included in the usual nationwide surveys that have to pass through
government institutions for their approval and implementation. This independence often
pays o⁄ in detailed information from various con￿ ict experience questions. The drawback of
low pro￿le - low budget surveys, is their small number of observations. Examples of type-III
studies relying on explicit household con￿ ict experience questions are Bellows and Miguel
(2009), Deininger (2003), Verpoorten and Berlage (2007) and Verpoorten (2009). The latter
two rely on a small scale survey and analyze the information at the household level while
the former two use a nationally representative survey and aggregate the household answers
at the community level in order to obtain a spatial measure of con￿ ict intensity.
The concern for developing a more uniform measure of con￿ ict intensity has triggered
of a debate on the inclusion of a standard con￿ ict module in household surveys (Br￿ck,
Justino, Verwimp, and Avdeenko (2010)). The introduction of such a module would most
certainly be a way forward since it would provide detailed and comparable information on
7diverse con￿ ict experiences at the level of households or individuals for a number of countries.
However, in many post-con￿ ict countries, it would take some time before a survey can be
organized upon the restoration of peace, and the longer it takes, the more the data will be
prone to recall bias as well as attrition bias which is especially large in post-con￿ ict countries
due to excess mortality and population displacement. While this drawback can be overcome
in time with the help of funding, hand-on experience and innovative survey design, there are
by now a large number of current post-con￿ ict countries for which too much time will have
past between the restoration of peace and the implementation of an ingenious post-con￿ ict
household survey. Besides, there is one drawback that cannot be overcome, i.e. the limited
geographic coverage of a household survey. Even if the household survey is nationwide, it is
often geographically strati￿ed and many administrative units will not be covered. This limits
the scope for matching the con￿ ict intensity measure derived from the household data (e.g.
by averaging household con￿ ict experiences at the community level) with data from other
sources, including other household surveys as well as statistics on local public and private
investment.
3 A new measure of con￿ ict intensity
This section develops a new spatial measure of con￿ ict exposure that is not meant to replace
existing measures, but is meant to be complementary and is particularly useful for measuring
con￿ ict cycles that are characterized by di⁄erent forms of violence and a large death toll
(direct or indirect). The basis for this measure is population census data, which is widely
available. For example, among the 15 Sub-Saharan African countries experiencing civil
war since the 1990s, 12 have had a post-con￿ ict population census and two (Angola and
DR Congo) are planning one in 2011 (UCDP/PRIO con￿ ict data and UN population census
statistics4). The exception is Somalia. Moreover, among the 12 countries with a post-con￿ ict
population census, we count 10 countries that have had a pre-con￿ ict population census,
which provides useful information for calculating a geographically disaggregated mortality
baseline.
The measure is constructed in three steps. First, a number of mortality proxies are calcu-
lated separately for the pre- and post-war census at the level of the smallest administrative
unit that they have in common5. These proxies may include widowhood (%), orphanhood
4http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/sources/census/censusdates.htm
5Provided that this smallest common administrative unit is large enough in terms of population to reduce
8(%) and mortality of sons and daughters (% of life births). For each of these proxies, age cat-
egories are de￿ned. For example, the proportion of orphans may be calculated for individuals
aged 30 or less. The choice of age limits is somewhat arbitrary and should be complemented
with a sensitivity analysis.
We can write the pre- and post-war vectors of p mortality proxies at the level of admin-










In a second step, the ￿rst di⁄erence is taken between the post-war and pre-war mortality
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Third, the set of wartime excess mortality proxies is summarized into an index by taking
a weighted sum, with the weights determined by PCA6. The ￿rst PC will be an appropriate
summary of excess mortality on a less to more scale if it captures a relatively high percentage
of the total variance present in the excess mortality proxies set and the "loadings" of that
PC have roughly equal values. The ￿rst PC, referred to as the Wartime Excess Mortality
the impact of outliers and erroneous data.
6PCA has the desirable property of reducing the dimensionality of a data set while retaining as much as
possible of the variation present in the data set. From a set of variables, PCA extracts orthogonal linear com-
binations that capture the common information in the set most successfully. The ￿rst principal component
(PC) identi￿es the linear combination of the variables with maximum variance, the second principal com-
ponent yields a second linear combination of the variables, orthogonal to the ￿rst, with maximal remaining
variance, and so on.
Formally, suppose that x is a vector of p random variables and x
￿ is a vector of the standardized p variables,












2 + ::: + ￿1px
￿
p;





1￿￿1; with ￿ the covariance matrix of x
￿;which
corresponds to the correlation matrix of the vector x of the original, unstandardized variables. For the purpose
of ￿nding a closed form solution for this maximization problem, a normalization constraint, ￿
0
1￿1 = 1, is
imposed. To maximize ￿
0
1￿￿1 subject to ￿
0
1￿1 = 1, the standard approach is to use the technique of Lagrange
multipliers. It can be shown that this maximization problem leads to choosing ￿1 as the eigenvector of ￿





1￿￿1 = ￿1. To interpret the PC in terms of
the original variables, each coe¢ cient ￿1l must be divided by the standard deviation, sl; of the corresponding
variable xl. For example, a one unit increase in xl; leads to a change in the 1st PC equal to ￿1l=sl:For a
detailed exposition of principal component analysis we refer to Jolli⁄e (2002) and Dunteman (2001).
9Index, can be written as:
WEMIj=l ￿ WEMPj = l ￿ [wempj1;wempj2;:::;wempjp]
with l the vector of loadings obtained through PCA.
A number of studies have used PCA for the purpose of summarizing con￿ ict indicators
by a con￿ ict index. Pioneering work by Hibbs (1973) derives indices of "collective protest"
and "internal war" from a 108-nation cross-sectional analysis of six event variables on mass
political violence. Following Hibbs (1973) a large number of cross-country studies have used
an index of sociopolitical instability as an explanatory variable in regressions in which the
dependent variable is growth, savings or investment (e.g. Venieris and Gupta (1986), Barro
(1991), Alesina and Perotti (1996)). To the best of our knowledge, only one micro-economic
study, GonzÆlez and Lopez (2007), uses PCA to summarize variables into a micro level index
of violent con￿ ict. This study, looking at the e⁄ect of political violence in Columbia on farm
household e¢ ciency, de￿nes ￿ve indicators of violence: homicides, the number of attacks
by FARC guerrillas, the number of attacks by ELN guerrillas, kidnappings, and displaced
population. The ￿rst PC accounts for 43% of the joint variance of the ￿ve indicators, and
is retained as an index of political violence. The main di⁄erence between these previous
studies and the measure proposed in this study is that WEMI relies on population census
data instead of event data or data from transitional justice records.
In the demographic literature, there is a long tradition of studies that infer excess mortal-
ity from characteristics of the surviving population, a method referred to as indirect mortality
estimation (e.g. Hill and Trussell (1977), Timaeus (1986)). The main di⁄erence with the
current approach is that, instead of trying to come up with an absolute number for excess
mortality, which is far more demanding in terms of data requirements and assumptions, the
WEMI aims at capturing relative excess mortality, i.e. its spatial distribution on a less to
more scale.
4 Illustration: measuring the Rwandan con￿ ict cycle
4.1 The Rwandan con￿ ict cycle
The Rwandan con￿ ict cycle of the nineties included civil war, genocide, reprisal killings,
(counter)insurgency and a major refugee crisis. Civil war broke out in Rwanda at the end
of 1990, when the RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front), a rebel army consisting mostly of Tutsi
10exiles, started launching attacks from Uganda7. Intermittent hostilities and negotiations
between the FAR (Armed Forces of Rwanda) and the RPF resulted in a power sharing
agreement, signed in Arusha (Tanzania) on August 4, 1993. But on April 6, 1994 the plane
carrying President Habyarimana of Rwanda on his way back from negotiations in Dar-es-
Salam was shot down while landing. Thereafter, Rwanda descended into chaos. Within
hours, the FAR, the Interahamwe8, administrators and ordinary people started to kill Tutsi,
moderate Hutu and Hutu leaders from political parties rival to the president￿ s party, the
MRND (National Revolutionary Movement for Development). Simultaneously with the start
of genocide (and politicide), the civil war between the FAR and the RPF resumed.
Late in June 1994, the RPF took power and the massive killings came to an end. The
balance of the events was shocking: an estimated 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu killed in
a time span of barely 100 days ( Des Forges (1999), Prunier (1998), Verpoorten (2005)). In
addition, tens of thousands of people died from deprivation in refugee camps, became direct
or indirect victims of the civil war between the RPF and the FAR, or fell victim to reprisal
killings by the RPF both inside Rwanda and across the border with Congo (Davenport and
Stam (2009), Reyntjens (2009), the "Gersony report"9, Verpoorten (2010a)). Regarding the
two latter forms of violence, Davenport and Stam (2009) estimate that, during April-June
1994, the sum of victims in zones under RPF control and the zones contested by the RPF
and FAR amounted to respectively 80,000 and 90,000.
Even when relative peace was established in Rwanda by the end of 1994, until the late
nineties, violence continued in the Northwest which was the locus of insurgency and coun-
terinsurgency operations on the part of respectively the FAR and Interhamwe - who used
Congo as a basis for sporadic attacks, and the RPF - who remained military active close to
and across the border with Congo in order to ￿ght the insurgents.
While these events all occurred in the nineties, their geographic location within Rwanda
7The population of Rwanda and of the neighboring Burundi consists of three groups: Hutu, Tutsi and a
small minority of Twa. Before the genocide the Tutsi made up approximately 10% of the population and
the Twa 1%. The remaining population were Hutu. Before the colonization the borderline between Hutu
and Tutsi was quite ￿ exible, because at times families could change status. Moreover, a substantial number
of chiefs were Hutu, especially those supervising access to land. Under Belgian colonial rule the distinction
between the two groups became more rigid. Almost all chiefs were Tutsi (See Prunier, 1995, chapter 1). In
1959 while the country was still under Belgian rule, the Tutsi king was removed and Hutu took over the
government.
8Interahamwe literally means ￿those who stand together￿or ￿those who attack together￿. This militia was
formed by Habyarimana￿ s political party in 1992, when the party started giving military training to its youth.
9The "Gersony Report" is the name given to an unpublished report that identi￿ed a pattern of massacres
by the RPF. The ￿ndings in the report were made by a team under Robert Gersony under contract to the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Gersony￿ s personal conclusion was that between April and
August 1994, the RPF had killed "between 25,000 and 45,000 persons, between 5,000 and 10,000 persons each
month from April through July and 5,000 for the month of August" (Des Forges (1999)).
11di⁄ered, with the 1991-1993 civil war con￿ned to the northern provinces, the 1994 genocide
especially severe in the South of the country, the 1994 civil war most intense in and around
the capital city and the 1994-1998 (counter)insurgency concentrated in the Northwest (see
Figure 1). Studies discussing the spatial pattern of the con￿ ict cycle include Des Forges
(1999), Davenport and Stam (2009) and Verpoorten (2010a).
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Insert Fig. 1 about here
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
4.2 The Wartime Excess Mortality Index (WEMI)
For the construction of WEMI, I rely on a 10% random draw of the 1991 population census
(N=742,918 individuals; accessed online from IPUMS International) and the entire 2002
population census (N=8.1 million; received from the Rwandan Government). Verpoorten
(2005) demonstrates that the Rwandan census data are very reliable except for the recording
of ethnicity10. The 2002 census includes information at the level of the administrative sectors
(N=1540). However, the smallest available administrative unit in the 1991 population census
is the commune (N=145), which is one administrative unit above the sector. Hence, I
calculate the excess mortality proxies at the commune level, which still is a fairly small
administrative unit with an average size of 174 squared km.
An important note to make is that the aftermath of the Rwandan con￿ ict was charac-
terized by a huge refugee crisis and considerable internal and external migration. Therefore,
I calculate the commune level 2002 mortality proxies (mp) both including and excluding in-
dividuals who changed residence over the period 1991-2002. The results excluding migrants
are presented in this article. The results including migrants are qualitatively the same and
can be obtained on request.
Taking the di⁄erence between 2002 and 1991 mp, I derive the following ￿ve wartime
excess mortality proxies (wemp) for 145 communes (j = 1:::145) in Rwanda:
- (wempj1) ￿Mortality of sons : 2002-1991 di⁄erence in total number of boys died/number
of boys born (for all women who ever gave birth);
- (wempj2) ￿Mortality of daughters : 2002-1991 di⁄erence in total number of girls
died/girls born (for all women who ever gave birth);
10Tutsi were underreported in the census, either by the Habyarimana regime to keep their school enrolment
and public employment quotas low, either by Tutsi themselves to avoid discimination.
12- (wempj3) ￿Widowhood : 2002-1991 di⁄erence in the proportion of widows among
women (>=30 years);
- (wempj4) ￿Double orphanhood : 2002-1991 di⁄erence in the proportion of double
orphans among children and youngsters (<30 years);
- (wempj5) Disability : the proportion of the 2002 population reporting a handicap due
to war or genocide.
Table 2 provides summary statistics for the pre-war and post-war mp and their ￿rst
di⁄erences (wemp): For all mp, we ￿nd higher values in the 2002 population census than in
the 1991 population census. The mortality of sons and daughters increased with respectively
8 (from 20% to 28%) and 7 (from 18% to 24%) percentage points. Widowhood rose from
18% to 31% and orphanhood from 2% to 5%. Disability due to genocide or war was not
present in the 1991 census and amounted to 0.3% in 2002.
Subjecting the set (wempj1 ￿ wempj5) to PCA results in the following ￿rst PC:
WEMIj= 0:48 ￿ wempj1 + 0:43 ￿ wempj2 + 0:46￿wempj3
+0:48 ￿ wempj4 + 0:38￿wempj5,
which explains up to 69% of the total variation of the variable set and has signi￿cant positive
loadings on all Wartime Excess Mortality Proxies.
Figure 2a plots the quintiles of WEMIj on an administrative map of Rwanda. We observe
a large number of top quintile communes in Butare, in and around Kigali City, in Gisenyi, in
the northwestern corner of Kibungo and in the southwestern corner of Umutara. In addition,
we ￿nd smaller local clusters in the West of Ruhengeri and Kibuye and in the Southeast
of Gitarama and Gikongoro. Taken together, this map re￿ ects well the di⁄erent forms of
violence in Rwanda based on event data. For a detailed analysis of spatial determinants
of WEMI, I refer to Verpoorten (2010a) who demonstrates that the pattern of WEMI is
strongly related to spatial determinants of the 1994 genocide, the 1994 open warfare between
the RPF and the FAR, the 1994-1998 refugee crisis and the 1995-1998 (counter)insurgency.
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
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4.3 Genocide Excess Mortality and other Excess Mortality (GEMI, CEMI)
I develop a two-dimensional con￿ ict intensity measure to distinguish between genocide and
other forms of violence. In order to do so, I expand the set of variables subjected to PCA
with rich information on genocide intensity. This information is taken from the transitional
Rwandan justice system in charge of judging 1994 genocide suspects (gacaca), which collected
information on genocide suspects and survivors in the course of 2005-2007 (Government of
Rwanda (2005)). The numbers of genocide suspects and survivors were made public in the
course of 2007. Verpoorten (2010b) discusses the reliability of the data and explains in detail
how the data can be transformed to obtain genocide intensity proxies.
The six Genocide Proxies that can be derived from the gacaca data include the number
of genocide suspects classi￿ed in three categories (gp1 ￿ gp3) as well as three categories of
surviving genocide victims (gp4 ￿ gp6), i.e. close relatives of persons who were killed during
the genocide. De￿ned at the commune level j and taken proportional to the 1994 population,
this results in the following six variables:
￿ (gpj1) Genocide suspects accused of planning, organizing or supervising the genocide,
and committing sexual torture (% 1994 population)
￿ (gpj2) Genocide suspects accused of killings or other serious physical assaults (% 1994
population)
￿ (gpj3) Genocide suspects accused of looting or other o⁄ences against property (% 1994
population)
￿ (gpj4) Widowed genocide survivors (% 1994 population)
￿ (gpj5) Orphaned genocide survivors (% 1994 population)
￿ (gpj6) Disabled genocide survivors (% 1994 population)
Table 3 provides summary statistics. The genocide suspects of category 1, 2 and 3
account on average for 1.2%, 6.8% and 5.0% of the 1994 population. The categories of
genocide survivors - widows, orphans and disabled - make up a smaller proportion of the
population, respectively 0.5%, 1.2% and 0.2%.
14The six genocide proxies (gpj1 ￿ gpj6) and the ￿ve wartime excess mortality proxies
(wempj1 ￿ wempj5) are subjected to PCA to obtain up to 11 PCs. Denoting the latter by
the vector ej and the former by the vector gj, the ￿rst four PCs are given by the following
linear combinations:
PC1j = [0:23;0:19;0:12;0:16;0:23]0￿ej + [0:39;0:39;0:31;0:39;0:39;0:33]0￿gj
PC2j = [0:40;0:38;0:46;0:46;0:31]0￿ej + [￿0:15;￿0:19;￿0:25;￿0:18;￿0:15;￿0:08]0￿gj
PC3j = [0:20;0:33;0:04;0:02;￿0:49]0￿ej + [0:19;0:27;0:45;￿0:24;￿0:20;￿0:45]0￿gj
PC4j = [￿0:33;￿0:57;0:39;0:40;0:15]0￿ej + [0:25;0:02;0:32;￿0:19;￿0:19;￿0:06]0￿gj
Combined, these four PCs explain 86% of the total variance in the underlying set of 11
variables. However, PC3 and PC4 add relatively little to the explained variance, respectively
9% and 5%, and they do not suggest a clear interpretation. In contrast, the ￿rst two principal
components each explain a sizeable proportion of the variance (43% and 29% respectively)
and combined account for 72% of the joint variance of the 11 variables. Moreover, they both
have a rather straightforward interpretation.
The loadings for the ￿rst PC are highest for the genocide proxies, gj, while the excess
mortality proxies, ej, are the dominant group in the second PC. Given that the ￿rst PC has
dominant loadings on the genocide proxies, it is interpreted as a Genocide Excess Mortality
Index (GEMI). The loadings on the second PC imply that, after genocide related violence
has been accounted for, the main source of variation is between sectors with large excess
mortality proxies relative to the genocide proxies. Therefore, the second principal component
is interpreted as excess mortality stemming from other sources, including Civil war, reprisal
killings, the refugee Crisis and (Counter)insurgency (CEMI)11.
Figures 2b and 2c plot quintiles of respectively GEMI and CEMI. We ￿nd the highest
values for GEMI in the South of Rwanda, in the center close to Kigali City and in the
eastern province Kibungo. This pattern corresponds with the event data underlying Figure
1 as well as with the intensity of genocide described in other studies (Davenport and Stam
(2009), Justino and Verwimp (2006), Verpoorten (2010b)). CEMI yields the highest values
in the northern provinces of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri, around Kigali City as well as in the
eastern provinces Byumba and Kibungo. This spatial pattern coincides with the location of
RPF battle fronts and zones that were situated in the eastern and central part of Rwanda
11See Jolli⁄e (2002) for a comprehensive exposition on the interpretation of PCs.
15in the course of the months April-July 1994, and ￿nally, in the period 1995-1998, in the
Northwest at the border with Congo (Davenport and Stam (2009), Verpoorten (2010a)).
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4.4 Accounting for possible survival bias
The con￿ ict intensity indices, WEMI, GEMI and CEMI may be biased downward in
communes where many families were entirely exterminated. In order to attenuate the e⁄ect
of survival bias, I increase the weight of communes that are close to sites of large-scale
massacres. The proximity to a large-scale massacre is taken into account by adding the
natural logarithm of the commune level distance to the nearest mass grave to the set of
variables subjected to PCA. This distance is calculated in km by overlaying a geo-referenced
administrative map with the location of 71 mass graves in Rwanda taken from the Yale
Genocide Studies website.
The resulting con￿ ict indices are given by the following linear combinations:
WEMI_sj = [0:47;0:42;0:45;0:48;0:38]0￿ej + [￿0:15]￿sj




with sj "log(distance to mass grave)" and gj and ej as de￿ned above.
This adjustment for survival bias does not yield qualitatively di⁄erent results with respect
to the spatial pattern of the indices (Figure 2) or in the application of armed con￿ ict and
schooling (Section 5). A sensitivity analysis with respect to the age limits for the excess
mortality proxies wempj3 and wempj4 (setting the age limits 5 years lower (at 25) or 5 years
higher (at 35)) neither alters the qualitative results. The results of these robustness checks
are not reported in this paper, but can be obtained on request.
165 Application: armed con￿ ict and schooling in Rwanda
The aim of the application is to assess how the newly proposed one- and two-dimensional
measures perform in an empirical application. Evaluating the usefulness of a measure by
means of an empirical application is problematic when the expected outcome is contested by
theory or by previous empirical studies. Hence, the application focuses on a well-established
impact of armed con￿ ict, i.e. its negative impact on schooling (e.g. Lai and Thyne (2007)).
The section proceeds in three steps. First, I describe the data on schooling. Second, I
use con￿ ict exposure in time to identify the impact of armed con￿ ict on schooling with a
di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence (DD) estimate, and I do so for all 145 communes separately, obtaining
a spatial pattern of the 1991-2002 schooling de￿cit, which is compared with the spatial
pattern of WEMI, GEMI and CEMI. Third, I combine information on con￿ ict exposure in
time with con￿ ict exposure in space to calculate (both OLS and IV) di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence-
in-di⁄erence (DDD) estimates that relate the 1991-2002 schooling de￿cit to WEMI, GEMI
and CEMI.
5.1 Schooling data
I use information on the number of years of schooling for individuals aged 6 to 50 in a 10%
random draw from the 1991 and 2002 population census12. The individuals are divided
across a young and an old cohort. The young age cohort in 2002 represents the group of
individuals exposed to the armed con￿ ict at primary schooling age (6-12). The age limits of
this age cohort are set at 6 and 22 since 6 is the age at which children start primary school
and those aged 22 in 2002 were aged 12 at the start of the con￿ ict in 1990 (alternative age
categories give similar results - see subsection 5.4 for a discussion).
In the 10% random draw of the 1991 and 2002 census, the young age cohort (6-22) counts
respectively 305,881 and 347,540 individuals, while the old age cohort (23-50) counts respec-
tively 211,007 and 221,025 individuals. Table 4 provides summary statistics on schooling
attainment across 1991 and 2002 for both age groups combined. The ￿gures show an in-
crease over time in the proportion of individuals with some primary schooling (from 55.5%
to 61.1%) and with some secondary schooling (from 5.1% to 8.2%).
However, when distinguishing between the age groups, we ￿nd that this progress in
schooling is entirely driven by the old age cohort. Table 5 shows a progress of 0.8 years of
12I use only 10% of the 2002 census, because STATA cannot perform the regression analysis for the entire
census (8.1 million observations).
17schooling for the old age cohort and a drop of 0.2 years for the young age cohort, yielding
a DD estimate of almost one year of schooling, or, when taking log(years of schooling) as a
dependent variable, a 20% decrease in the number of years of schooling.
This result is in line with the study of Akresh and de Walque (2008) who study years
of education of a young (6-15) and an older (16-35) age cohort in the 1992 and 2000 DHS
survey and conclude that children exposed to armed con￿ ict completed close to one-half
year less education which corresponds to a 18.3% drop relative to the average educational
achievement.
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5.2 Di⁄erence-in-Di⁄erence estimates: the spatial pattern of the 1991-
2002 schooling de￿cit
Given that the data used for this analysis include 1,074,561 individuals divided across 145
communes, we have su¢ cient observations to calculate commune level DD estimates to iden-
tify the spatial pattern of the schooling de￿cit. The commune level DD are obtained by
estimating the following equation for each commune j separately:
Yijt = ￿j0 + ￿j1(Tt ￿ youngi) + ￿j2Tt + ￿j3youngi + "1
ijt
with
Yijt : average years of education of individual aged i in commune j at time t
Tt : indicator variable for being in the 2002 census
youngi : indicator variable for being in the young age cohort
"ijt : idiosyncratic error
The coe¢ cients ￿j1 give estimates of the 1991-2002 schooling de￿cit for 145 di⁄erent
communes. It are DD estimates identi￿ed from discrete treatment Tt, with the young age
cohort the treated and the old age cohort the non-treated group. Figure 3 plots the quintiles
of
^
￿j1 on a map. The spatial pattern shows clusters of large drops in schooling in the
Northwest, scattered throughout the centre, the South and East. While this pattern is very
18di⁄erent from GEMI (Fig. 2b), it is similar to WEMI (Fig. 2a), which suggests that the
1991-2002 schooling de￿cit in Rwanda is not only due to genocide, but also to other events
of the con￿ ict cycle.
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5.3 Di⁄erence-in-Di⁄erence-in-Di⁄erence estimates: explaining the 1991-
2002 schooling de￿cit
Finding a close match between two spatial patterns is not enough to establish causality
between armed con￿ ict and the schooling de￿cit. To determine causality, we take the analysis
two steps further. First, we estimate a DDD e⁄ect in which treatment is de￿ned as being in
the young age cohort in the 2002 sample and residing in a geographic unit with high violent
con￿ ict intensity. Second, we instrument for con￿ ict intensity.
The DDD estimate corresponds to the coe¢ cient ￿1 in the following equation:
Yijt = ￿0 + ￿1(Tt ￿ Cj ￿ youngi) + ￿2(Tt ￿ Cj) + ￿3(Tt ￿ youngi)





Yijt : average years of education of individual i in commune j at time t
Tt : indicator variable for being in the 2002 census
Cj : commune level measure of con￿ ict intensity, rescaled to ￿t the interval [0;1]
youngi : indicator variable for being in the young age cohort
Xijt : household and individual level controls13
￿i : age ￿xed e⁄ects
￿j : province ￿xed e⁄ects
"ijt : idiosyncratic error
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Insert Table 6 about here
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
19Table 6 gives the OLS results with Cj de￿ned as the previously derived con￿ ict indices
WEMIj, GEMIj and CEMIj, respectively in columns (1), (2) and (3). The estimated
coe¢ cient
f
￿1is negative and highly signi￿cant, with respective values of ￿0:59;￿0:13 and
￿0:63. Since the con￿ ict indices are rescaled to the interval [0;1], these values can be
interpreted as the change in the number of years of education when moving from zero to
maximum con￿ ict intensity. These results suggest that, compared to GEMIj, the impact of
CEMIj on schooling is more severe, which stands in contrast with the study of Akresh and
de Walque (2008) who attribute the entire estimated schooling de￿cit to genocide. In column
(4), GEMIj and CEMIj are jointly included, which yields very similar point estimates to
those of columns (2) and (3) because GEMIj and CEMIj are orthogonal vectors (which is
a feature of PCA).
The estimates for ￿1 may be biased due to reversed causality, i.e. the incidence or
intensity of con￿ ict may have been higher in those areas where there was a downward trend
in education. Alternatively, there may be omitted variable bias, i.e. excess mortality may
have increased for another reason besides con￿ ict and this increase may have gone hand in
hand with a decrease in education. Both of these sources of endogeneity bias can be remedied
for with an instrumental variable approach.
We use the commune level distance to Uganda as a ￿rst identifying instrument. At the
peak of the civil war and genocide in 1994 the RPF in￿ltrated from Uganda and gradually
moved towards Kigali City engaging in heavy battles with the Rwandan army before even-
tually taking over the capital. The battle front then moved to other areas of the country,
safeguarding the remaining Tutsi from being killed and engaging in reprisal killings on Hutu
who allegedly participated in the genocide (Davenport and Stam (2009))14. The exogenous
character of the border stems from colonial history, as it was ￿xed following a compromise
agreement by European nations15.
A second identifying instrument for con￿ ict intensity is the commune level distance to
Nyanza, a sector located in the northwestern corner of Butare, close to the border with
14Previous work on Rwanda and elsewhere has used similar instruments. Miguel and Roland (Forthcoming)
use the distance to the meridian that distinguishes North from South Vietnam as an instrument for bombing
intensity in Vietnam, while Akresh and de Walque (2008) also use distance to Uganda, measured at the level
of 11 provinces, as identifying instrument for armed con￿ ict in Rwanda. In this study I use more detailed
spatial data, and use the distance of each of the 145 communes to Uganda. The use of this ￿ner instrument
should considerably add to its strength.
15The border was ￿xed in 1910 at an Anglo - German - Belgian Convention in Brussels, following a 1890
compromise agreement between the United Kingdom and Germany that provided that the boundary between
British and German territories should follow the parallel of one degree south latitude across Lake Victoria
and should continue westward to its intersection with the 30th meridian of longitude east of Greenwich
(Department of State (1965)).
20Gikongoro and Gitarama province. Nyanza was the capital of the Tutsi monarchy, which
controlled most of the present-day Rwandan territory from as early as the 14th century. Its
economic and political importance faded during colonization and abruptly ended with the
1959 revolution and subsequent 1962 independence. The government reorganized Rwanda￿ s
administrative division shortly after independence. The southern and western outskirts of
the Nyanza region were attached to what is now the eastern part of Gikongoro, a highland
area inhabited largely by Hutu. The aim was to weaken Tutsi in￿ uence around the former
royal capital Nyanza (Des Forges (1999)). Today nothing is left of Nyanza￿ s former glory,
but the proportion of Tutsi in the communities close to Nyanza was still higher prior to
the genocide (Verpoorten (2005)), which makes it a relevant instrument for the intensity of
ethnic violence.
The ￿rst stage IV results are reported in Table 8 and demonstrate the relevance of both
instruments16. Table 7 reports the second stage IV results17. Compared to the OLS results,
the IV results for ￿1 in columns (1), (3) and (4) are very similar. However the IV estimate
in column (2), which measures the impact of
^
GEMIj, is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from
zero. This is likely due to the failure to control for other forms of violence, which now a⁄ect
the control group of the DD. Note that this is not an issue in the OLS results in Table 6
because GEMIj and CEMIj are orthogonal vectors. However, upon instrumenting, the
orthogonality between GEMIj and CEMIj disappears. When adding
^
CEMIj as a control
variable in column (4), the coe¢ cient on
^
GEMIj turns again negative and signi￿cant. These
results suggest that failing to take into account all forms of violence may result in severely
biased estimates.
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5.4 Robustness checks
Both the OLS and IV estimate for ￿1 remain qualitatively the same after correcting for sur-
vival bias, i.e. when replacing the con￿ ict indices by WEMI_sj, GEMI_sj and CEMI_sj
16Distance to Nyanza has the expected negative sign, re￿ ecting high genocide intensity near Nyanza. Dis-
tance to Uganda has a positive sign, indicating high con￿ ict intensity further away from the border with
Uganda, re￿ ecting the 1994 civil war in the centre and the east, with the battle intensifying as the RPF
proceeded.
17Because we estimate the IV models with 2SLS, which yields consistent parameter estimates but biased
standard errors, we correct the standard errors using the procedure proposed by Baltagi (2002).
21(results reported in Table 9). Looking at the quantitative e⁄ect, we ￿nd that the estimated
OLS (IV) coe¢ cient on GEMI_sj is 13.8% (35.4%) larger compared to the one on GEMIj,
whereas the di⁄erence is negligibly small for CEMIj and CEMI_sj. This suggests that
survival bias is especially an issue for the measurement of genocide related excess mortality.
I run three other robustness checks. First, I use WEMI_mj, GEMI_mj and CEMI_mj
which are the con￿ ict indices calculated for the entire 2002 population, i.e. including mi-
grants. Second, I use di⁄erent age categories for widowhood and orphanhood (-5 years and
+5 years) to calculate wempj3 and wempj4. Finally, I replicate the results using di⁄erent
de￿nitions for the young and old age cohort, including those used by Akresh and de Walque
(2008), i.e. 6-15 and 16-35, as well as 8-17 and 17-37. All robustness checks yield results
that are qualitatively the same as those presented in Tables 4 to 8, and they can be obtained
on request.
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6 Comparison with previous measures
Table 10 lists the results of the OLS and IV estimates of the coe¢ cient ￿1 for cases where
Cj equals con￿ ict intensity measures that were described and/or used in previous studies. A
detailed description of all 15 alternative measures can be consulted in the Appendix.
The 15 measures include (i) ￿ve dummies of con￿ict intensity at the province level pre-
viously used in studies by Justino and Verwimp (2006), Akresh, Verwimp, and Bunder-
voet (forthcoming) and Akresh and de Walque (2008); (ii) six other province level mea-
sures derived from diverse sources including the Genodynamics Project (Davenport and
Stam (2009)), Yale Genocide Studies, the 1991 population census, ACLED (Raleigh, Linke,
Hegre, and Karisen (2010)) and the records of the transitional justice system (Government of
Rwanda (2005)); (iii) four commune level measures based on data from Yale Genocide Stud-
ies, the 1991 population census and the gacaca records (previously used by Yanagizawa
(2010)).
The OLS results for these alternative measures are mixed: (i) three of the ￿ve province
level dummies yield a signi￿cantly negative estimate for ￿1; while two result in a signi￿cantly
positive estimate; (ii) among the six continuous province level measures, two yield a signif-
icantly positive estimate for ￿1; and four give an insigni￿cant result; (iii) three out of the
22four commune level measures result in the expected e⁄ect on schooling; and the remaining
one gives an insigni￿cant result. The IV results are also very di⁄erent across measures and
can be consulted in Table 10.
Hence, even in a seemingly straightforward application of the impact of armed con￿ ict
on schooling, di⁄erent micro-level con￿ ict measures yield strinkingly di⁄erent results.
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7 Conclusion
How should we measure micro-level con￿ ict intensity in order to take a step forward in
the study of the legacy of armed con￿ ict? This paper argues that there is a need for ￿ner
measures that can capture di⁄erent forms of violence and that can be used to compare results
across countries.
It is demonstrated how widely available data, i.e. population census data, and a com-
monly used method, Principal Component Analysis, can result in a ￿ne index of Wartime
Excess Mortality, referred to as WEMI. This index is neutral to the cause of excess mortality
and is therefore well suited in a context in which di⁄erent forms of violence took place.
Its neutrality may be a drawback in the sense that WEMI may capture other causes
of mortality, besides the direct and indirect impact of violence. However, this drawback
can be taken care of with an instrumental variable approach, which has become standard
practice by now in empirical studies on the impact of armed con￿ ict to correct for the possible
endogeneity of con￿ ict intensity.
The WEMI is calculated for the case of Rwanda and it is shown that its spatial pattern
corresponds well with three main forms of violence taking place in Rwanda in the nineties:
civil war, genocide and (counter-)insurgency. Moreover, adding detailed data on the genocide
to the set of "neutral" excess mortality proxies, it is demonstrated how one can distinguish
between genocide excess mortality and other forms of excess mortality by means of a two-
dimensional measure (GEMI, CEMI).
Both the one- and two-dimensional index indicate a signi￿cantly negative impact of armed
con￿ ict on schooling in Rwanda. In contrast to Akresh and de Walque (2008) who attribute
the entire schooling de￿cit in the nineties to genocide, the ￿ndings in this paper show that
other events in the Rwandan con￿ ict cycle explain at least half of the schooling de￿cit.
23The proposed one- and two-dimensional measure can contribute to the micro-economic
study of the legacy of di⁄erent forms of violence in Rwanda. On the one hand, previous
studies on health and educational outcomes can be replicated with a richer measure of
violent con￿ ict intensity, allowing deeper understanding of e.g. the impact of di⁄erent forms
of violence. On the other hand, new issues in the area of technology, institutions and social
norms that require ￿ne spatial information on con￿ ict intensity can be addressed.
The WEMI can be calculated for a set of other post-con￿ ict countries, which may open
the perspective for useful comparisons of country case studies. Admittedly, since WEMI is
a relative rather than an absolute measure (i.e. excess mortality on a less to more scale
across administrative units of a single country), the results of di⁄erent country case studies
need to be interpreted accordingly. In addition, the set of countries for which WEMI can
be calculated will be a nonrandom subset of post-con￿ ict countries, i.e. countries where
violence resulted in high excess mortality and where post-con￿ ict institutions are su¢ ciently
(co)operative to collect and release population census data.
In countries where di⁄erent forms of violence took place and rich data is available on
at least one form of violence, the WEMI can be a basis for developing a multi-dimensional
index. If we succeed in identifying how di⁄erent forms of violence within the borders of the
same country have di⁄erent e⁄ects on the socioeconomic variables studied, we may come a
long way in understanding the impact of violent con￿ ict on poverty.
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Type(s)*Measurement of conflict exposure Outcome studied Country Reference

















































































































































































 Educational Attainment:  Obs.  %O b s .   %
No Schooling   174,363 30.67 203,459 39.36
 Some Primary Schooling   347,676 61.15 286,972 55.52
 Some Secondary Schooling   46,526 8.18 26,457 5.12









 Old Cohort    3.727***    2.934***   0.793***
     [0.007]    [0.007]   [0.010]  
 Young Cohort   2.651***   2.853***   ‐0.202***
     [0.004]    [0.005]   [0.007]  
 Difference    ‐1.076***    ‐0.081***   ‐0.955***  































 Young Cohort * CS 2002   ‐0.922*** ‐1.128*** ‐0.922*** ‐0.899***
     [0.024]   [0.021]   [0.023]   [0.029]  
CS 2002   0.528*** 0.637*** 0.521*** 0.515***
  [0.020]   [0.018]   [0.019]   [0.024]  
 Household Level Controls?   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
 Child Age Fixed Effects?    Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
 Province Fixed Effects?    Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  

































 Young Cohort * CS 2002   ‐0.801*** ‐1.142*** ‐0.924*** ‐0.808***
     [0.029]   [0.029]   [0.020]   [0.038]  
CS 2002   0.408*** 0.551*** 0.514*** 0.341***
  [0.024]   [0.024]   [0.017]   [0.031]  
 Household Level Controls?   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
 Child Age Fixed Effects?    Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
 Province Fixed Effects?    Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  




Dependent Variable:  WEMI GEMI CEMI
Excluded instruments:
log(distance to Nyanza) ‐0.060*** ‐0.082** ‐0.018
  [0.039]     [0.037]   [0.034]  
log(distance to Uganda) 0.084*** 0.052* 0.067**
  [0.030]     [0.028]   [0.026]  
Included instruments: 
 Household Level Controls  Yes    Yes   Yes  
 Province Fixed Effects?    Yes    Yes   Yes  













All constitutive terms of the interaction effect? Yes   Yes   Yes    Yes  
 Household Level Controls?  Yes   Yes   Yes    Yes  
 Child Age Fixed Effects?   Yes   Yes   Yes    Yes  
 Province Fixed Effects?   Yes   Yes   Yes    Yes  











C1 '94 genocide dummy  0.168*** [0.021]   0.264*** [0.050]  
C2 '90‐'92 civil war dummy 0.042* [0.027]   ‐0.066*** [0.047]  
C3 '90‐'94 civil war dummy ‐ 0.135*** [0.019]   ‐0.363*** [0.052]  
C4 '94‐'98 (Counter‐)insurgency dummy  ‐0.119*** [0.024]   ‐0.005 [0.052]  
Genodynamics project
C5 '94 death toll dummy ‐ 0.139*** [0.021]   0.194*** [0.054]  
C6 Days with killings in April‐July '94 0.155*** [0.046]   0.160*** [0.054]  
ACLED
C7 Number of battle events  0.023 [0.036]   0.094* [0.087]  
1991 Population census
C8 Proportion of Tutsi  0.029 [0.031]   ‐0.033 [0.058]  
Yale genocide studies
C9 Number of mass graves 0.006 [0.028]   0.131*** [0.050]  
C10 Distance to mass grave 0.037 [0.036]   ‐0.011 [0.055]  
Gacaca records
C11 Proportion of genocide suspects 0.077*** [0.027]   0.240*** [0.048]  
Commune level measures
1991 Population census
C12 Proportion of Tutsi ‐ 0.165** [0.078]   ‐0.064 [0.045]  
Yale genocide studies
C13 Number of mass graves ‐0.357*** [0.050]   ‐0.143*** [0.043]  
C14 Distance to mass grave 0.097* [0.055]   0.098** [0.050]  
Gacaca records






















Province level measures WEMI GEMI CEMI
Event data  
C1 Genocide dummy  Justino & Verwimp, 2006 0.35 0.48 ‐0.32*** 0.31*** ‐0.54***
C2 '90‐'92 civil war dummy Akresh et al., forthcoming 0.25 0.43 ‐0.09*** ‐0.59*** 0.24***




0.20 0.40 0.27*** ‐0.379*** 0.51***
Genodynamics project
C5 '94 death toll dummy  Akresh & de Walque, 2008 0.32 0.46 0.28*** 0.41*** 0.09***
C6 Days with killings in April‐July '94 Akresh & de Walque, 2008 24.22 20.39 0 0.31*** ‐0.18***
ACLED  
C7 Number of battle events  N.A. 30.87 18.11 0.07 ‐0.38*** 0.25***
1991 Population census
C8 Proportion of Tutsi  Akresh & de Walque, 2008 0.08 0.06 ‐0.11*** 0.58*** ‐0.46***
Yale genocide studies
C9 Number of mass graves  Akresh & de Walque, 2008 6.28 4.88 0.10*** 0.56*** ‐0.21***
C10 Distance to mass grave N.A. 12.29 7.81 ‐0.13*** ‐0.51*** 0.15***
Gacaca records
C11 Number of perpetrators N.A. 0.07 0.04 ‐0.05*** 0.66*** ‐0.43***
Commune level measures
1991 Population census
C12 Proportion of Tutsi  N.A. 0.12 0.14 0.17*** 0.68*** ‐0.17***
Yale genocide studies
C13 Mass grave N.A. 0.47 0.81 0.20*** 0.47*** ‐0.03
C14 Distance to mass grave N.A. 12.29 10.17 ‐0.22*** ‐0.53*** 0.05*
Gacaca records
C15 Number of perpetrators Yanagizawa, mimeo 0.07 0.05 0.14*** 0.85*** ‐0.33***
Correlation with Description of 15 alternative conflict intensity measures 
 
This appendix describes 15 conflict intensity measures for Rwanda (denoted C1‐C15). These measures are used to 
produce the results in Table 10. Table A1 gives an overview.  
Eleven (C1‐C11) of the 15 measures are at the province level, the remaining four (C12‐C15) are at the commune 
level. The measures rely on six distinct primary data sources. 
1.  Event data    
   C1:   '94 genocide dummy 
   C2:  '90‐'92 civil war dummy 
   C3:   '90‐'94 civil war dummy 
   C4:  '94‐'98 (Counter‐)insurgency dummy 
Justino and Verwimp (2006) rely on event data
1 to evaluate the intensity of genocide, civil war and counter‐
insurgency in Rwanda across provinces. They identify four provinces with high 1994 genocide intensity (Butare, 
Cyangugu, Kibuye, Gikongoro ‐ C1). The provinces are further categorized in provinces with high (Kibungo, Rural Kigali, 
Ruhengeri and Byumba ‐ C3) and low 1990‐1994 civil war intensity and provinces with high (Ruhengeri and Gisenyi ‐ C4) 
and low levels of 1994‐1998 (counter)‐insurgency. In a study on the impact of the 1990‐1992 civil war on height‐for‐age 
z‐scores, Akresh et al. (forthcoming) use an indicator variable for provinces exposed to civil war in 1990‐1992 (Byumba 
and Ruhengeri ‐ C2). 
2.  Genodynamics project    
   C5:   '94 death toll dummy 
   C6:   Days with killings in April‐July '94 
    In their study on the impact of armed conflict on schooling, Akresh & de Walque (2008) use a conflict intensity dummy 
that takes one for Butare, Rural Kigali, and Kibungo, the three provinces with the highest 1994 death toll. In addition, 
they use the province level number of days with killings in the period April‐June 1994. Both measures are taken from the 
Genodynamics project
2, which compiled data on 1994 casualties from different sources, including The Ministry of 
Education in Rwanda, Ministry of Youth, Culture and Sports in Rwanda, IBUKA (an association of Tutsi survivors), African 
Rights and Human Rights Watch (both international human rights organizations).  
3.  ACLED    
   C7:   Number of battle events 
    The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED), described in Raleigh et al. (2010), record 322 battle events in 
Rwanda for the period 1990‐2002. The precision of the geographical information varies across battle events, with about 
two thirds identified at the commune level and one third at the province level. Therefore, the information is aggregated 
at the province level. 
4.  1991 population census 
   C8 & C12: Province and commune level proportion of Tutsi in the population 
                                                            
1 e.g. the Human Rights Watch report of Des Forges (1999) which is largely based on witness accounts. 
2 For more information on the Genodynamics project, see Davenport and Stam (2009) and http://www.genodynamics.com.     From the 1991 population census, one can derive the proportion of Tutsi both at the province level (C8) and at the 
commune level (C12). This is useful information because Tutsi were targeted in the genocide and their proportion in the 
population varies widely across as well as within provinces. 
5.  Yale Genocide Studies 
  C9 & C13 : Province and commune level number of mass graves 
  C10 & C14: Province and commune level distance to nearest mass grave 
    On the website of Yale Genocide Studies, one can find a map with the location of 71 mass graves in Rwanda. The map 
was realized by the Rwandan commission of genocide memorial. The number of mass grave sites and memorials per 
province is used as a third measure of war intensity in the paper of Akresh & De Walque (2008). We look at two related 
measures, which are defined at the province level (C9‐C10) as well as the commune level (C13‐C14): the number of 
massgraves and the distance to the nearest mass grave. The distance to the nearest mass grave (in km) is calculated by 
overlaying a geo‐referenced administrative map with the location of 71 mass graves in Rwanda. 
6.  Gacaca records 
  C11&C15   Province and commune level proportion of genocide suspects 
    Over the period 2005‐2007, the transitional Rwandan justice system in charge of judging 1994 genocide suspects, 
referred to as gacaca, collected information on genocide victims, suspects and survivors (Government of Rwanda, 2005). 
The sector level numbers of genocide suspects and survivors were made public in the course of 2007. In a study of the 
impact of propaganda (through radio transmission) on civilian participation in the genocide, Yanagizawa (2010) makes 
use of the commune level proportion of genocide suspects to proxy participation (C11&C15).  
 